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5

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from two cases that were consolidated on
appeal, one a guardianship proceeding and the other a probate
proceeding, for trial of issues determinative of the validity of
a will executed November 28, 1977 by Grace M. Anderson, deceased.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial on the merits to the court, the court,
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order, Judgment, and Decree declaring the
validity of the will of November 28, 1977, by Grace M. Anderson
and admitting said will to probate.

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the decision below.

FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts is inconsistent with the
record as follows:
1.

K.

o.

Smith was not the nephew of Charles H. Anderson.

He was not even a blood relative of Grace M. Anderson.
claimed to be a long-time friend of hers.
2.

He only

(G-5)

The Stipulation in open court at the hearing on June

28, 1977, had no terms and conditions, at that time, regarding
further testamentary dispositions or deeds nor any requirement of
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court approval.

(G-49)

Subsequently on July 30, 1977, a

stipulation with certain terms and conditions was executed by the
parties,

(G-50), which were an afterthought on the part of the

appellants for which there was no consideration.

{Finding of Fact

I I , R. , pp . 2 5 2 - 5 3 )

In other regards the Appellants' Statement of Facts is
incomplete, as shown by Finding of Fact II, R., pp. 252-53, as
follows:
(a)

That on or about the 17th day of May, 1977,

Lois Jean Osborn petitioned the court for the removal of
Kenneth O. Smith as guardian for Grace M. Anderson, an.
aged person, and for the substitution of herself.

(b)

That the parties agreed that

tha~

(G-30)

issue would

be resolved by the wishes of Grace M. Anderson.
(c)

That Grace M. Anderson chose Lois Jean Osborn.

(d)

That Gerald Hess prepared a stipulation to the

change of guardian, which was executed by Kenneth O. Smith
and Lois Jean Osborn on or about July 30, 1977.
(e)

{G-50).

That on or about August 11, 1977, the Court

issued an order incorporating the terms of the
Stipulation.
{f)

(G-54)

That on or about August 11, 1977, Lois Jean

Osborn was appointed conservator for Grace M. Anderson,
an aged person.
(g)

{G-62)

That th~ actual purpose of the stipulation and

Court Order referred to in paragraphs (d) and {e) above

-2-
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was to satisfy Kenneth O. Smith's desire to receive
notice of any subsequent wills or deeds of Grace M.
Anderson rather than to raise any question regarding the
competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute such documents.
(h)

That on or about February 14, 1978, Kenneth O.

Smith petitioned the court to set aside the will of
November 28, 1977, and two deeds that had also been
executed by Grace M. Anderson on that date, because there
had been no prior court approval.
(i)

(G-63}

That David B. Boyce, attorney for the

proponent, Lois Jean Osborn, had intended to present the
deeds and will of November 28, 1977, to the court for
approval but such had not been done prior to February 14,
1978.

(G-63)
(j)

That because there had not been prior court

approval and with the understanding that a hearing would
eventually be held to determine- the competency of Grace
M. Anderson to execute the deeds and will of November 28,
1977, or any other such documents, counsel for the
proponent, Lois Jean Osborn, entered into a Stipuulation
that resulted in the Court Order that they were void.

(G-73, 98)
(k)

That on April 27, 1978, Lois Jean Osborn filed

a petition with the court to have the court determine the
competency of Grace M. Anderson to have executed the

-3-
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deeds and will of Noyember 28, 1977, or any other such
documents.

(1)

(G-81)
That trial was scheduled on said petition for

April 11, 1979, before Judge Swan, but
died on March 7, 1979.
{m)

~Grace

M.

Anderson

(G-138)

That the appointments of various guardians and

conservators were because Grace M. Anderson was an aged
person and not because she was incompetent and there
never was, during the lifetime of Grace M. Anderson,
any evidentiary hearing of any kind to determine her
compentency.

{G-1, 3-4, 13, 21-22, 30, 50, ·54, 62, 98,

109-110}
(n)

That Judge Swan's order voiding the deeds and

will of November 28, 1977, was issued summarily, upon
stipulation, and in the absence of any prior hearing as
to the competency of Grace M. Anderson.

(G-73, 100)

No transcript of the testimony was designated by the
appellants as part of the record on

appeal~

Therefore, the

Findings of Fact of the trial court are conclusively presumed to
be supported by the testimony given at the trial and such Findings
of Fact are unassailable.

McDonald v. Shaw, 581 P.2d 1017 (Utah

19 7 8) •
The only objection to the Findings of Fact by the
appellants was to Finding of Fact II(g).

(E-248)
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND THE DEEDS IS INVALID

The right or privilege of disposing of property by will
is accorded by statute in all American jurisdictions, and although
it is recognized that the right is a creature of statute, and
subject to legislative control, the right is a valuable one and
will be sustained wherever possible.

79 AM JUR.2d

§

54, Wills.

it has even been held that the right to make a will is a sacred
and constitutional right.
(Wis. 1963).

State v. Horan, 123 N.W.2d 488

The privilege has been characterized as a sacred,

I

untrammeled, valuable, and absolute right, and as a privilege
guaranteed by law, although not with intent to place the privilege
beyond control of the legislature.

79 AM JUR.2d

§

5, Wills.

In Utah the only statutory restrictions on the making of
a will are contained in
amended, as follows:

§

75-2-501, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as

"Any person 18 or more years of age who is

of sound mind may make a will."

Grace M. Anderson was more than

18 years of age when she executed the will under date of November
28, 1977, and it has been determined by the trial court that she
was of sound mind when she executed it.

In the case of Anderson

v. Anderson, 134 P. 533 (Utah 1913), the Supreme Court of Utah
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said that the right to make a will cannot be invaded or abrogated
by the courts; only the legislature could do that.

In the case at bar, the appellants are contending that
the valuable right of Grace M. Anderson to execute a will should
be abrogated by an interim order of the trial court even though
the trial court subsequently determined, in the only evidentiary
hearing, that she was competent when the will was executed.

Her

competency is not being contested in this appeal.
The facts surrounding the order voiding the will are
essential to understand why the interim order should in no way be
used to abrogate the valuable right of the decedent ·to make her
own determination of the disposition of her

propert~.

On May 17,

1977, Lois Jean Osborn executed a petition for the removal of
K. O. Smith as guardian and the appointment of herself as guardian
for Grace M. Anderson, an aged person.
II(a), R. p. 252)

(G-30; Finding of Fact

K. O. Smith and Lois Jean Osborn agreed that

that issue would be resolved by the wishes of Grace M. Anderson.
(Finding of Fact II(b), id.)
Osborn to be guardian.

Grace M. Anderson chose Lois Jean

{G-49; Finding of Fact II(c), id.)

No

other conditions were imposed at that time with regard to future
wills or deeds.

(G-49)

Subsequently a stipulation, which required

court approval of wills and deeds, was prepared to change the
guardian.

(G-50; Finding of Fact II(d), id.)

the court issued an order

~ncorporating

On August 11, 1977,

the terms of the
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stipulation.

(G-54; Finding of Fact II(f), id.}

The trial court

found the purpose of the stipulation and order was to give notice
to K. 0. Smith of any subsequent deeds or wills of Grace M.
Anderson.

(Findings of Fact II(g}, id.)
Grace M. Anderson executed the deeds and will of

November 28, 1977, prior to giving notice to K.
to petitioning the court for approval.

o.

Smith and prior

This was so the court

would be able to see what it was being requested to approve.
The respondents had intended to present the deeds and will of
November 28, 1977, to the court for approval but had not done so
at the time that the appellants petitioned the court to set them
aside. (Finding of Fact II

(i),

R., p. 253).

I

I

Even if K. O. Smith had been given notice of the deeds

and the will of November 28, 1977, and had the court been
petitioned before their execution for approval, no determination
of validity would have or should have been made because it is
improper to do so until after the death of the testator.

This is

because wills are ambulatory in nature and can be revoked until
death.

Ther~fore,

a will can only be contested after death.

Johnson v. Johnson, 336 P.2d 420 (Utah 1959).
In the only objection to the Findings of Fact, the
appellants contend that the purpose of the stipulation that notice
be given to K.

o.

Smith, the previous guardian, was to give him a

chance to have a competency examination of Grace M. Anderson if

-70

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

she executed deeds or a new will.

(E~

248)

Even if Smith had been

given notice, that may not have given him the right to require her
to submit to a mental examination.

Even if Smith could require

Grace M. Anderson to submit to a mental examination, that would
only be so that he could attempt to preserve evidence of
competency until after her death, since competency cannot be
decided until then.

Johnson v. Johnson, supra.

did have the requested mental examination.

In reality Smith

Grace M. Anderson was

examined by Dr. Jack Tedrow regarding her mental competency on the
12th day of June, 1978.

That was not long after the will and

deeds and could have been sooner if the appellants had exercised
their rights under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
I

I

So the appellants got all they were entitled to even

under their explanation for the purpose of the notice requirement
in the stipulation.

Even if they had not been allowed to examine

Grace M. Anderson, that would not make the deeds and will void.
The valuable right of the decedent to execute the deeds
and will cannot be abrogated on the facts of this case.

The

primary reason is that the order was not a final determination nor
was it intended to be. (See Point II below.)

Furthermore, the

stipulation was not made by the decedent, Grace M. Anderson.

Both

the stipulation requiring court approval for the deeds and will
and the stipulation voiding the deeds and will for lack of court
approval were made by David
. B. Boyce.

The appellants contend that
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he was the attorney for Lois Jean Osborn and not Grace M. Anderson.
(G-112)

In Finding of Fact II(i), he is found to be the attorney

for Lois Jean Osborn.

On November 15, 1978, K. O. Smith, one of

the appellants, filed a motion for the appointment of an attorney
for Grace M. Anderson.

(G-111)

On November 30, 1978, the court

ordered that an attorney be appointed to represent Grace M.
Anderson.

(G-116)

deeds and will.

That took place after the execution of the

(G-119-120)

So Grace M. Anderson was apparently

unrepresented when the stipulations were executed and was not a
party to the stipulations that resulted in the order voiding the
will and deeds.
Not only was Grace M. Anderson not a party to the
I

stipulations that resulted in the court orders, but Nina O.
Scalley, one of the primary residuary beneficiaries under the
will, will not represented and was not a party to the stipulations.
(G-50)

So the stipulations and resulting court orders are

ineffective because they were not made by the testatrix, who was
competent, or her attorney, and they were not made by one of the
primary beneficiaries of the will.
The recognized methods for revocation of a will are set
forth in§ 75-2-507, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
states as follows:
(1)

A will or any part thereof is revoked:
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It

(a)

By a subsequent will which revokes the
prior will or part expressly or by
inconsistency; or

(b)

By being burned, torn, canceled,
obliterated or destroyed, with the
intent and for the purpose of revoking
it by the testator or by another person
in his presence and by his direction.

The stipulation and order voiding the will would not have been
valid even if the testatrix had so stipulated because such was not
a recognized method for revocation.
It should be noted that the statutory provisions for
revocation all require the intent of the testatrix.

There is

nothing in the record in this case to show that the ·testatrix
intended to revoke the will of November 28, 1977.
I
I

The

app~llants

contend that under § 75-5-42 of the

Uniform Probate Code, the court had jurisdiction and power to void
the will and deeds.

That statute is immaterial because the will

and deeds were not voided because of the statute.

That statute

provides for the voiding of any sale or encumbrance to a
conservator of any transaction which is affected by a substantial
conflict of interest.

There was no sale or encumbrance to the

conservator and there is no evidence of any transaction affected

by a substantial conflict of interest.

The order voiding the will

and deeds was based on the stipulation and had nothing to do with
that statute.
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In paragraph 1 of Point II of the appellants' brief, they
state that the provisions of the stipulation which required court
approval were conditions precedent to the change of guardianship.
'
If that is the case, then the remedy the appellants should have
sought when the stipulation was allegedly violated, was· to seek a
rescission of the stipulation.

In other words, K.

o.

Smith was

stipulating that Lois Jean Osborn could become the guardian if all
future deeds and wills were presented to the court for approval.
Even assuming that the stipulation was breached, the remedy for
the appellants would be to rescind the stipulation approving of
the change in guardian.

A violation of the stipulation does not

make the deeds and will invalid.

This can be illustrated by

I

referring to other provisions of the stipulation.

For example,

the stipulation provided that Lois Jean Osborn would post a bond,
that she would render an accounting and that before Grace M.
Anderson was placed in a nursing home, there would be court
approval.

Under the rationale of the appellant, if Lois Jean

Osborn had failed to post a bond or had failed to render an
account or had placed Grace M. Anderson in a nursing home without
.court approval, then the deeds and will would be invalid.
logic does not follow.

Such

The court order requiring court approval

for future wills and deeds did not say that any such deeds and
will would be invalid without court approval.

(G-54)
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POINT II
THE ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND DEEDS WAS NOT A FINAL
DETERMINATION OF THEIR VALIDITY
Even assuming that the stipulations and orders were valid
and that Grace M. Anderson could be required to get court approval
for the deeds and will, there was a petition pending and trial
date set when Grace M. Anderson died to acquire that court
approval.

(G-81)

The fact that the testatrix died before the

issues were decided does not resolve the matter; it simply
postponed the decision until after her deathe

(Actually, that

was the only proper time to have determined competency anyway.
Johnson v. Johnson, supra)
I

If she was competent and not acting

•

under undue influence, then the will and deeds are valid.

Court

approval was eventually obtained at the trial of this matter
wherein the court determined that Grace M. Anderson was competent
to execute the deeds and will of November 18, 1977, and that she
was not unduly influenced in so doing.

(E-251-258)

The appellants contend that the record does not reflect
the understanding that a hearing would eventually be held to
determine the competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds
and will.

Findings of Fact II(i-1) clearly reflects that intent

and understanding and those findings are unassailable due to lack
of a transcript.

McDonald v. Shaw, 581 P.2d 1017 {Utah 1978).
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The order of the court under date of August 11, 1977,
says in part as follows:
4. That as guardian of the estate of Grace
M. Anderson, Lois Jean Osborn shall not sell or
otherwise transfer or dispose of any real
property of Grace M. Anderson without first
petitioning and obtaining approval of this Court.
•

•

•

•

6. Lois Jean Osborn shall not sign any
trusts or any testamentary devises for Grace M.
Anderson, nor shall Grace M. Anderson sign any
such documents for herself without first
petitioning and obtaining approval of this Court
(emphasis added). (G-54)
So the order itself contemplated the possibility of a hearing to
determine the competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds
and

From the language of the order itself, it is apparent

w~ll.

that even Judge Swan did not consider his order to be final.

He

would not have set the matter on the trial calendar if he thought
the order was final.
On April 27, 1978, Lois Jean Osborn

execut~d

a petition

that was filed with the court on May 1, 1978, which says in part
as follows:
2. That Grace M. Anderson is under Court
order not to sign any trusts or testamentary
devises without first petitioning and obtaining
approval of the Court and she desires to have the
Court make such approval and in connection
therewith, to determine that Grace M. Anderson
has the capacity to execute trusts or
testamentary devises and to execute deeds and
similar documents. Wherefore, your petitioner
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prays that . • • an order be entered approving
testamentary devises executed by Grace M.
Anderson and giving her the right to execte
trusts, testamentary devises, deeds or similar
instruments in the future without further court
approval (emphasis added). (G-81-82)
At the time of the petition, the will and deeds of November 28,
1977, had already been executed.

So the petition was a petition

to approve of the deeds and will of November 28, 1977.

The court

then scheduled a hearing for October 12, 1978, on the petition to
consider conf irrning those documents that she had executed.

{G-89)

At the hearing on October 12, 1978, the issues raised by the
petition were assigned to the trial calendar.

(G-94)

On January

4, 1979, a request for trial setting was filed with the court.
(G-12~)

Pursuant to the request for trial setting, notice of

pretrial was filed January 8, 1979, setting pretrial for January
29, 1979.

(G-122)

Notice of trial was filed with the court

February 9, 1979, wherein trial was scheduled for April 11, 1979.
(G-138)
was held.

Grace M. Anderson died on March 7, 1979, before the trial
In light of these facts, it is difficult to imagine how

the appellants can contend that the record does not reflect that a
hearing would eventually be held to determine the competency of
Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds and will of November 28,
1977.
For the reason that it was contemplated by the court and
by the parties that a hearing would eventually be held to
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determine the validity or invalidity of the deeds and will, there
was no need for the respondents to appeal from Judge Swan's order
nor was there any need for any reservation pursuant to Rule 72 of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellants conclude Point I of their argument by
asking the following question:

"How do you void the deeds and

will by stipulation of the parties while Grace M. Anderson is
alive and then resurrect the will when she is

dead?'~

The answer

to that question is simple and in the answer is the resolution of
this appeal.

The answer is that the voiding of the deeds and will

by stipulation

(assuming the Court order is valid) was only a

preliminary or interim order that may have made them void until a
I

heari~g was held.

They are "resurrected" after death because the

hearing was not held until after her death.

After her death, at

the only evidentiary hearing ever held regarding competency, it
was determined that she was competent, which has not been
challenged by Appellants.

POINT III
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ARE INAPPLICABLE
The appellants contend that the order voiding the will
and deeds is res judicata or that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel applies to prevent the trial judge from overruling that
order.

Those doctrines are entirely inapplicable in this case.
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They have to do with the relitigation of issues in the interest of
judicial economy.

To relitigate something obviously requires a

previous litigaton.
case.

There was no previous litigation in this

The issues were only heard once and that was at the trial.

Finding of Fact II(m)

is as follows:

(m}
That the appointments of various
guardians and conservators were because Grace M.
Anderson was an aged person and not because whe
was incompetent and there never was, during the
lifetime of Grace M. Anderson, any evidentiary
hearing of any kind to determine her competency.
(G-1, 3-4, 13, 21-22, 30, SO, 54, 62, 98,
109-110)
The appellants recite the four basic essentials of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel on page 13 as follows:
,

,

1.

Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action in question?

2.

Was the final judgment on the merits?

3.

Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party in privity with the party
to the prior adjudication?

4.

Was the issue in the first case competently,
fully, and fairly litigated?

The answers to those questions show the inapplicability
of that doctrine in this case.

In answer to question No. 1, the

issues were not decided in connection with the order voiding the
will and deeds.

So it cannot be said that the issue decided in

the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in this
action.
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The second essential element of the doctrine is to have a
final judgment on the merits.

The order voiding the will and

deeds was obviously not the final determination since a trial was
scheduled to make that determination.
The fourth element is that the issues be competently,
fully and farily litigated in the first case.
case.

There was no first

So the issues were not even litigated before the trial of

this matter, let alone competently, fully, and fairly.

POINT IV
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NO WAY VIOLATES THE LAW

DESPITE THE PRIOR ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND DEEDS
I

.

I

This is not a situation where the judge of one division

of the same court is overruling an order of another judge.

Judge

Palmer, in trying the case, was simply doing what Judge Swan would
have done had he still been on the bench. and that was having the
hearing that was always contemplated and that Judge Swan scheduled
to determine the right of Grace M. Anderson to execute the will
and deeds.

Judge Palmer was not reviewing Judge Swan's order.

In In re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975}, this
Court allowed Judge Taylor to make an order changing a previous
order of Judge Jeppson because Judge Taylor had jurisdiction for
what he did.

In the case at bar, Judge Palmer certainly had

jurisdiction to have the hearing that Judge Swan authorized and
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could have heard himself had he been on the bench when it came on
for hearing.

Once the matter was placed on the trial calendar, it

was triable by any of the judges in the district.

It was always

contemplated that the interim order could be changed.
In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974), this
Court said that it is not impossible under some circumstances for
one district judge to vacate the orders of his colleagues.

In

Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977),
the Supreme Court of Utah said that preliminary or interim rulings
do not rise to the dignity of res judicata.

The Court went on to

say that the ruling of one judge as to the sufficiency or effect
of pleadings does not prevent another division of the court from
I

considering that same question of law if it is properly involved
on a subsequent motion which presents the case in a different
light, as in this case.

POINT V
PETITIONER SCALLEY IS NOT BOUND BY A COURT ORDER
IN A PROCEEDING TO WHICH SHE WAS NOT A PARTY.
Petitioner Scalley was not a party to Probate No. 1-3347
and thus cannot be bound by an order premised and founded upon a
stipulation entered into by the parties to that action.

That she

was a residual beneficiary under the November 28, 1977, will of
Grace M. Anderson does not.come close to placing her in privity to
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the position of Petitioner Osborn in the guardianship proceeding.
Furthermore, the question of privity doesn't even arise in this
case because no litigation of issues occurred until the trial of
this matter.

Thus the summary order of Judge Swan based upon a

stipulation she did not sign cannot bind her.

CONCLUSION
The right to dispose of property by will is a valuable
right to be upheld wherever possible.

Only the legislature, and

not the courts, can abrogate that valuable right.

The legislature

in Utah has given the right to everyone over the age of 18 who is
of sound mind.

In the only evidentiary hearing regarding the

competency of Grace M. Anderson, it has been determined that she
was competent on November 28, 1977, the date of the execution of
the will and deeds.
The only possible reason to invade her right to make her
will would be the order requiring court approval and the order
voiding the deeds and will.

Those orders should not·invalidate

the deeds and. will because (1) the order voiding the deeds and
will was an interim order not intended to be final; (2) competency
cannot be determined until death; (3) the purpose claimed by the
appellants for the requirement that notice be given to them of any
subsequent deeds or will was complied with in that they were able
to have a mental examination of Grace M. Anderson; (4) the
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stipulations resulting in the order requiring court approval and
the order voiding the deeds and will were not entered into by the
testatrix or her attorney or by one of the primary beneficiaries
under the will; (5) the order voiding the deeds and will is not
one of the recognized statutory methods for revocation of a will;
and (6} notice was simply a condition precedent and failure to
give notice would only allow a rescission of the change of
guardianship, but would not void the deeds and will.
Even if the order voiding the deeds and will is valid, it
was only a preliminary order awaiting a final determination.
There is no question from the record on appeal that -a hearing to
determine the validity of the will and deeds of November 28, 1977,
was anticipated even after the order voiding them.

At that final

determination, it was concluded that Grace M. Anderson was
competent and was not unduly influenced in the making of the deeds
and will.
Since there is no question that Grace M. Anderson was
competent and was not unduly influenced in the making of the deeds
and will of November 28, 1977, there is no valid reason why the
deeds and will should not be determined to be valid and the will
should be admitted to probate as the Last Will and Testament of
Grace M. Anderson.
DATED this

day of March, 1982.

Sumner J. Hatch
Attorney for Responden~
Nina~

~~~~~~~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of March, 1982,

two copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT SCALLEY'S BRIEF were

mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, to each of the following:
Kent H. Murdock, Esq.
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David E. Bean, Esq.
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, Utah 84041
H. Ralph Klemm, Esq.
175 South West Temple, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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